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1OPTIMAL SHARING OF SURGICAL COSTS
I NT H EP R E S E N C EO FQ U E U E S
Paula González-Rodríguez and Carmen Herrero
ABSTRACT
We deal with a cost allocation problem arising from sharing a medical service in the presence
of queues. We use a standard queuing theory model in a context with several medical proce-
dures, a certain demand of treatment and a maximum average waiting time guarantee set by the
government. We show that sharing the use of an operating theatre to treat the patients of the
di¤erent procedures, leads to a cost reduction. Then, we compute an optimal fee per procedure
for the use of the operating theatre, based on the Shapley value. Afterwards, considering the
post-operative time, we characterize the conditions under which this cooperation among treat-
ments has a positive impact on the average post-operative costs. Finally, we provide a numerical
e x a m p l ec o n s t r u c t e do nt h eb a s i so fr e a ld a t a ,t oh i g h l i g h tt h em a i nf e a t u r e so fo u rm o d e l .
KEYWORDS: Surgical Waiting Lists; Queueing Theory; Cost-Sharing Game.
21I N T R O D U C T I O N
The widespread access to Public Health Care in western European countries is placing the system
at a point in which optimal allocation of resources becomes a major management problem. On
the one hand, and since health services are among the critical aspects to control the quality
of public services, the regularity and adequacy of hospital services turn out to be crucial for
the support of a certain government. On the other hand, management mistakes could have a
tremendous impact on the Health Administration budget.
Citizens are particularly sensitive to some phenomena related to health services. One of those
phenomena is the persistency of waiting lists for surgical treatment. The popular discomfort
under this phenomenon forces the government to perform some especial programs to temporarily
alleviate the problem. Notwithstanding, temporary programs cannot solve the problem, and may
be extremely costly.
In the existing literature on waiting lists for surgical treatment there seems to be two separate
traditions: the queueing theory tradition, which considers that the arrivals and service times
are stochastic events, and the welfare economics literature, where queues are understood as a
system for the distribution and allocation of resources.
Queueing theory studies this kind of problems from a statistical or operational research point
of view.1 Any system in which arrivals place demands upon a …nite-capacity resource may be
termed a queueing system. In particular, if the arrival times of the demands are unpredictable,
then con‡icts for the use of the resource will arise and queues of waiting customers will form.
The main idea to predict the behavior of the system, is, nonetheless, extremely simple: the
length of the queue depends upon the average rate of arrivals, and on the statistical ‡uctuations
of this rate. Certainly, if the average rate of arrivals exceeds the capacity, then the system breaks
down, and unbounded queues will form. However, when the average rate is less than the system
capacity, then here too, we have the formation of queues due to the statistical ‡uctuations and
spurts of arrivals that may occur.
The formation of waiting lists to get elective surgery, can be framed as a queueing system.
Queueing theory predicts several characteristics of the waiting lists such as the average waiting
time of the agents or the average length of the queue. Assuming that the agents are served
respecting their arrival order, the only control variable is the capacity to install. Consequently,
the theory can help us to take decisions concerning that capacity, taking into account that the
higher the capacity the higher the associated costs, but the shorter the expected queues.
The queueing system arising in surgical treatment has some speci…c characteristics: (1)
1For a general view of this topic see Gross and Harris (1997), Hillier and Lieberman (1995), Kleinrock (1975)
and Prabhu (1997).
3There are two sources for the formation of waiting lists. On the one hand, the capacity of the
operation theatre, and, on the other hand, the bed capacity of the hospital; (2) Several medical
procedures share both servers, namely, customers from di¤erent treatments need to use both
the operation theatre and the beds; (3) Each of those procedures have their own rate of arrival;
(4) Not all medical procedures are considered as equally urgent, in the sense that the average
waiting time politically considered as adequate di¤ers among procedures.
In the managing of such a situation, a cost allocation problem arises: Since di¤erent proce-
dures share both the operation theatre and the hospital beds, we have to design a cost allocation
rule in order to share the joint costs. This is the main purpose of this paper. In order to con-
struct a cost allocation rule, we use a game theoretical perspective, designing a cost allocation
game. In the …rst part of the paper we concentrate ourselves on the costs associated to the
operating theatre. Then, we construct a game by confronting two situations: one in which each
medical procedure has its own operating theatre, and another one in which there is a unique
theatre that serves all the diseases. We show that sharing the use of the operating theatre to
treat the patients of the di¤erent medical procedures, leads to a cost reduction. Then, we con-
struct a cost-sharing game and, given the characteristics of the game, we suggest a cost-sharing
rule that recommends the Shapley value allocation of the cost-sharing game. Thus, our optimal
tari¤ has all the nice properties of the Shapley value.2 The fact that this cooperative solution
can be computed easily, is certainly an important property in a practical environment.
The cost-sharing game emerging among the treatments is the sum of an additive game plus
an “airport game”,3 where the di¤erent landing track capacities are translated in our model to
the capacity required by the operating theatre in order to satisfy its demand, according to the
maximum average waiting time guarantee. A similar idea has been applied in Fragnelli et al.
(2000) to the construction of a railway path, as a proposal for the reorganization of the railway
sector in Europe. In their case, as we do here, the proposed solution to the cost-sharing game
is the Shapley value.
Up to this point, only the direct costs derived from surgical interventions were considered.
However, we have to take into account that an operation generates also other costs, more pre-
cisely the costs incurred during the patients’ hospitalization time for recovering. Then, we
introduce in the model the post-operative costs and we study how they are a¤ected by the
cooperation among medical procedures. Treating the beds as servers, we may model the hos-
2See Shapley (1953), Tijs and Driesen (1986), Young (1994) and Moulin and Shenker (1996).
3It is a game-theoretic approach to a cost- allocation problem arising at airports. Di¤erent types of airplanes
need di¤erent runway lengths, but the largest runway is su¢cient for all of them. Then, the problem lies in
allocating the capital costs of constructing the largest track among the set of users. See Littlechild and Owen
(1973) and Littlechild and Thompson (1977).
4pitalization stage also as a queueing system. Then, the number of servers (beds) required to
guarantee the service, can be computed in di¤erent scenarios. Nonetheless, there is no possibility
of arriving at general results, due to the lack of analytical solvability of the model.
In spite of that, something general can be said about the average number of beds. By
so doing, we show that sharing the use of the operating theatre has an ambiguous e¤ect on
average post-operative costs. If the medical procedure with the highest priority level, has a
higher recovering time than the average hospitalization time of the rest of the pathologies, we
can ensure that in average terms cooperation leads to post-operative cost savings.
A numerical example with real data is analyzed then. In this example, we compute the
distribution of surgical costs, applying the theoretical results obtained previously. As for the
number of beds required, we also compute them, under di¤erent scenarios. Also, we estimate
the distribution of bed costs among the procedures, provided that an upper bound of :1 is set
on the probability of waiting after the intervention.
Most of the contributions to the literature of hospital waiting lists have focused on the
demand side. Culyer and Cullis (1976) and Cullis and Jones (1985) highlight demand factors as
the ones a¤ecting the waiting list problem.
However, some papers address the problem from the supply side. For instance, Iversen (1993),
shows that the non-cooperative character of resource allocation in Public Health Services may
contribute to excessive waiting lists. Our work …ts in this supply side branch of the literature,
since we study the costs derived from increasing the capacity of the operating theatre in order
to decrease the time spent by the patients on the waiting list.
Recent papers mainly focus on the e¤ects of such waiting lists on patients’ welfare and on
the purchase of private health insurance. Johannesson (1998) develops a model of the bene…ts
and costs of being on a waiting list. Since changes in the length of the waiting time causes
complex shifts in utility streams, shorter waiting time need not necessarily be preferred to a
longer one. Besley (1999) shows that longer waiting lists for public treatment, are associated
with greater purchases of private health insurance. In our analysis, neither patients’ welfare nor
private provision is considered.
The problem of the hospital bed supply has been also treated in the literature. Joskow (1980)
and Worthington (1987) use a queueing model to analyze the characteristics of the hospital bed
supply. They both consider that the beds are the servers of the system. Hence, the waiting
lists are determined by the interaction between two facts: on the one hand, the arrival of new
patients and their lengths of stay and, on the other hand, the amount of available beds. Instead,
we consider that the queue is formed in the previous stage. Then, when a patient leaves the
queue and enters the operating theatre, we put a small upper bound to the probability that
5there is not a bed prepared for him.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model with its basic
assumptions. Section 3 studies the operating theatre costs. Section 4 computes the optimal
cost sharing. Section 5 introduces in the model the post-operative time. Section 6 provides a
numerical example. Finally, Section 7 gives some concluding remarks.
2T H E M O D E L
We consider the basic queueing process: customers requiring a service are generated over time by
an input source. These customers arrive to the system and join a queue. In di¤erent moments,
one of the customers is selected to receive the service by means of a queue discipline. Then, the
mechanism of service provides the service and the customer leaves the system.
In our problem, the customers are patients that require surgical treatment and the mechanism
of service is a hospital. Actually, there are two di¤erent sort of servers in our model: (1) the
operating theatre, and (2) the hospital beds. Any individual entering the system should go …rst
throughout the operating theatre, and once he/she is out of this server, a bed should be waiting
for him/her. The patient only leaves the system once he is released from the hospital.
Let us consider a situation in which we have n kind of diseases or medical procedures
and a certain number of patients requiring a service from the di¤erent procedures. Let N =
f1;2;:::::;ng denote the set of …elds of treatment.
We assume that the number of potential patients is in…nite. This is a standard assumption
in queueing theory, which simply makes the model analytically more tractable. The main im-
plication of this assumption is that the number of individuals in the queue does not a¤ect the
amount of potential entrants. It seems reasonable in our framework, since the probability of
needing some medical treatment is, in principle, independent from the amount of people requir-
ing it.4 We put no restriction on the length that the queue can reach, which is also standard in
the literature even when dealing with situations where actually a …nite upper bound exists, but
it is large enough.
We assume that the patients’ arrivals to the medical system follow a Poisson process. This
means that every period of certain length, has the same probability of receiving a patient. We
can de…ne ¸i 2 R++ as the average number of arrivals per unit of time, from the ith medical
procedure. This is equivalent to say that the time between arrivals of patients of the same type
is given by an exponential distribution with mean 1
¸i:
4In our work, we completely abstract from physicians’ strategic behavior. If we consider this possibility, this
assumption would be di¢cult to sustain, since the lenght of the waiting lists could a¤ect the incentives of the
General Practitioners to send more or less patients to an elective surgery treatment.
6The work an arriving patient brings into the operating theatre, equals the time of service
he requires. We consider this service time to follow a random process. Even if in principle
the length of a surgical intervention from a given medical procedure is …xed, an operation can
unexpectedly become more complicated, and hence require some extra time. Therefore, it is
necessary to consider some randomness in the service process.
We measure the service time not in absolute terms (length of the operation) but in relative
ones, using as reference the total time that the operating theatre is opened per day. For example,
if an intervention lasts 2 hours (in expected terms) and the service is opened 8 hours per day,
the expected service time of a patient would be 1
4: The interpretation would be that each patient
covers one-fourth of the total time the server is working in a day.
With this construction, the service time of the ith medical procedure would follow an expo-
nential distribution with average 1
¹i; and ¹i 2 R++; where 1
¹i captures the fraction of the total
working time of the server employed in one patient.
Analogously, ¹i would stand for the maximum expected rate (capacity) at which the system
can perform its work (di¤erent among treatments), i.e., the potential average rate of type i
patients’ departures per unit of time.
We require that ¸i <¹ i 8i 2f 1;2;:::::;ng, otherwise the queue would “explode” and the
system will break down.
We also assume that the queue discipline is “…rst come, …rst served”, i.e., the patients will
be chosen to receive the service by their order of arrival.5
As in many queueing theory models, we assume that the arrivals and departures from the
system behave as a “birth and death process”. Hence, we impose that in any given instant, only
one “birth” (arrival of a patient to the queue) and one “death” (departure of a patient from the
operating theatre) can occur.
Finally, we perform our analysis considering that we are in a situation in which the steady
state of the system has been reached.
3 OPERATING THEATRE COSTS
In order to characterize the costs associated with giving the operating theatre enough capacity
to provide the service in the legal maximum time, we consider two alternative scenarios. Recall
that in this Section, the system is simply the operating theatre.
In the …rst scenario, each surgical procedure has its own operating theatre to treat its pa-
5Another possibility would be to consider the case in which the queue discipline is based in some priority rule.
However, the mathematical analysis becomes more complicated and only limited results are available.
7tients. Let us denote by Wi the average waiting time of an individual of type i in the system.
Notice that this time includes not only waiting in the queue, but also the time spent in the
operating theatre.6 If we considered only the time in the queue, what in principle could seem
more reasonable, the qualitative results would not change and the model would become less
tractable. Moreover, the time spent in the operating theatre is negligible with respect to the
total time in the system. Under all previous assumptions, it is well-known that the average time





In the second scenario the di¤erent medical procedures share the use of a unique operating
theatre. Proceeding analogously, and denoting by W the average time of an individual in the







where ¹ is the average number of patients that leave the operating theatre per unit of time
(coming from any of the treatments) and
Pn
i=1 ¸i is the total average number of arrivals per
unit of time. Since the arrivals of patients are independent events across specialities, the total
number of arrivals follows also a Poisson process and its average is computed as the sum of the
average of the arrivals of the patients coming from the n medical procedures.
Finally, we consider that the government sets that, on average, the maximum waiting time in
the system for the ith medical procedure can not exceed ti, i.e., a maximum average waiting time
guarantee is provided.7 Moreover, these times di¤er across treatments (applying, for example,
an urgency criterium) and we suppose, without loss of generality, that t1 ¸ t2 ¸ ::: ¸ tn.
In the following subsections, we will study the costs required to ful…ll the government’s
objective under the two scenarios mentioned above. In order to do it, we will assume that the
costs are proportional to the amount of patients treated per unit of time. We interpret this as
having costs that are linear in the capacity of the server. In our case, an increase in the capacity
could be understood as having the operating theatre opened more hours, to be able to serve
more patients.
6As in this section we are only studying the direct costs derived from the operating theatre, we exclude from
our analysis the post-operative time spent at hospital.
7There exists evidence about the implementation of this kind of measures, by some Public Health Administra-
tions in Europe. For instance, a maximum waiting time guarantee was introduced in Sweden in 1992 to shorten
waiting times (see Hanning and Wimblad Spånberg (2000)). In Spain, the Ministry of Health and Consump-
tion has recently design a program (Programa Avance INSALUD) that tries to ensure an average waiting time
guarantee to those patients demanding elective surgery.
83.1 Di¤erent Operating Theatres
Since the costs of operating are proportional to the amount of patients treated, the overall costs
arising from the n operating theatres are just the sum of the individual costs. The explicit shape
of the individual costs is the following:
Ci = k¹i(ti);
with k 2 R++.
We have to set ¹i (the potential amount of patients from medical procedure i that leave, on
average, the theatre per unit of time) in order to guarantee the corresponding legal maximum
waiting time (ti). What indirectly we are setting is the number of hours that the theatre should















; 8i 2f 1;2;:::::;ng: (4)
As we can see these costs are increasing in the ratio at which the patients arrive (¸i), and
decreasing in the maximum average waiting time guarantee (ti). The two features are reasonable,
t h em o r ep a t i e n t st h a ta r r i v ea n dt h el o w e rt h ea v e r a g et i m ew ec a nk e e pt h e mw a i t i n g ,t h e
higher will be the costs.
The overall costs from keeping n operating theatres opened are, therefore:
CN =
Xn










3.2 A Single Operating Theatre
In this scenario, as there is only one operating theatre, the total costs will be given by:
C1 = k¹(T);
where ¹(T) is the potential number of patients treated, on average, per unit of time from any
medical procedure, and T is the lowest value that the maximum average time guarantee takes
across treatments. Formally:
T =m i nfti=i 2 Ng: (6)
This means that if the system has enough capacity to guarantee the legal average time ti for the
ith medical procedure, then it has to be able to serve also any medical procedure j with j<i
according to its legal maximum average time (recall that if j<ithen tj >t i).






















3.3 Comparing the Costs in both Scenarios
W ep r o c e e dn o wt oc o m p a r et h ec o s t so b t a i n e di nt h et w oa n a l y z e ds i t u a t i o n s . T h ea i mi st o
check if there is any kind of saving, understood as lower aggregate costs, in the scenario in which
the medical procedures share the use of the operating theatre.
Proposition 1 Sharing the use of the operating theatre leads to a cost reduction.
Proof. Using Equations (5) and (8) and, taking into account (6), it is straightforward to
compute the sign of the di¤erence between the costs keeping opened n operating theatres and
the costs maintaining only one which serves all the medical procedures. We obtain:







since both k and ti 8i 2f 1;2;:::::;ng are strictly positive.
Hence, we can see that it is possible to make savings if the di¤erent surgical procedures
cooperate and share the use of the operating theatre. Let us explain the reason for this. When
each medical procedure maintains its own server, it has to su¤er not only a cost that is propor-
tional to the average number of patients demanding surgical attention (k¸i), but also a …xed
cost depending on the maximum average waiting time guarantee for the medical procedure ( 1
ti).
This is due to the randomness of the process we are dealing with. Both the number of patients’
arrivals and the number of patients departures, are measured in expected terms, since we are
working with variables distributed according to random processes. Therefore, every operating
theatre should maintain some additional capacity, to prevent a situation in which a number of
patients higher than the expected one would arrive in a certain instant of time, or an operation
gets complicated, requiring some extra time. If there is cooperation among the medical proce-
dures, they maintain this necessary additional capacity just supporting together the …xed extra
cost of the most priority one. The degree of priority is understood in our model as the average
waiting time guarantee, and the lower the waiting time guarantee the higher the priority degree.
We can interpret the lower necessary capacity in terms of optimal risk-sharing among treat-
ments. When a medical procedure is on its own, it has to cover all the risks, understanding
10them as an excessive arrival of patients or a hard intervention. This means that it has to …x
supplementary capacity to be able of guaranteeing the legal average waiting time, even when
the circumstances are worse than expected during a certain period of time.
However, when this medical procedure shares the use of the operating theatre with others,
the “bad luck” in one treatment in a given day, may get compensated with the good one of
another. It is not so important if one medical procedure performs badly one day because it
can take some extra time from any other which has been more lucky in the realization of the
uncertainty. This is a similar phenomenon to risk spreading. As we can compensate the results
among medical procedures, we can serve the demand in the legal average time with less installed
capacity (and therefore, at a lower cost).
Since the scenario in which cooperation appears is cheaper than the other one, what is
interesting now is how to distribute among the medical procedures this bene…t from working
together or, equivalently, what is the optimal tari¤ that each treatment should pay for the use
of the service. In the following section, we will model this problem as a cost-sharing cooperative
game and we will compute an optimal fee.
4 OPTIMAL COST SHARING
Summarizing, the problem we are facing is the following: we have an operating theatre used by
patients coming from di¤erent surgical procedures and we try to divide across them the costs of
using the service. Then, we have to study how the operating theatre costs should be allocated
to the medical procedures through an optimal tari¤.
We shall construct now a cost-sharing game. Let us consider that the players are the di¤erent
surgical procedures, N = f1;:::;ng: The cost-sharing game is de…ned as follows: c :2 N ! R;
assigns to any non-empty coalition S of medical procedures the minimum cost c(S) under which
the time guarantee is ful…lled, for all the surgical procedures in S: For the empty coalition we
have c(;)=0 . Since sharing the operation theatre always conveys to a cost reduction, this
minimal cost will coincide with that necessary to keep functioning a single operation theatre,










where TS =m i n fti : i 2 Sg is the shortest average time guarantee within S; namely, the average
time guarantee established for the most urgent procedure in set S: Note that previous cost













11there is a variable expense, which is proportional to the number of patients of each medical











,w h i c h
is independent of the medical procedure the agents belong to. So, our cost-sharing game is the
s u mo ft w oo t h e rg a m e s ,c = cv + cf:
We shall adopt the recommendation given by the Shapley value of the game as a way of
distributing the costs among the surgical procedures. This solution has the following properties:
1. It is optimal, namely, it recommends to go for the largest possible cost reduction. In our
case, for the use of a single operating theatre. It divides the total cost c(N)=C1(N)
among the pathologies.
2. It is linear, namely, in order to solve a game which is the sum of two other games, we
simply solve them separately, and add. In our case, Sh(c)=Sh(cv)+Sh(cf):
3. It is symmetric, namely, if two procedures are indistinguishable in cost terms, they should
contribute the same amount to the total cost.
4. It is fair, namely, we cannot manipulate the outcome by introducing arti…cial procedures
with zero cost.
Our cost-sharing game is the sum of two other cost-sharing games: the variable cost-sharing
game, cv, and the …xed cost-sharing game, cf: Because of property (2), Sh(c)=Sh(cv)+Sh(cf):
It turns out that the variable cost-sharing game, cv, is a linear game. In this game there are no
cost reductions due to cooperation between di¤erent procedures. Consequently, Shi(cv)=k¸i;
for all i 2 N:
Notice that the …xed cost-sharing game, cf, is an analogous problem to the one appearing in
the“airport game”. In our case, instead of needing di¤erent landing track capacities for di¤erent
types of planes, we deal with several operating theatre capacities, depending on the maximum
average waiting time guarantee set by the government for the di¤erent surgical operations. This
is a concave game. Consequently, the Core of the game is not empty, and the Shapley value













So, the …xed cost of that operating theatre with enough capacity to serve all the procedures
depends essentially on the time guarantee of the procedure with the highest priority level (the
nth medical treatment in our case).
Baker (1965) and Thompson (1971) proposed a simple cost allocation rule to solve this type
of cost-sharing problems. Littlechild and Owen (1973) showed that the above mentioned cost
12allocation coincides with the cost allocation based on the Shapley value. We can express this
rule in the following way: each procedure contributes equally to the cost needed in order to
maintain opened an operating theatre for the medical treatment with the least priority; then
the contribution of the procedure with the least priority level is completely computed. Now, all
remaining procedures also contribute equally to the additional cost needed to maintain opened
a theatre for the treatment next in the …nite order. This way, the second procedure contribution
is completed, and so on.
























































Consequently, if in a certain period of time, we receive a set of patients M; where M =
M1 [¢¢¢[Mn and Mi stands for the set of patients for procedure i, mi =# Mi; we have the
following result:














































if j 2 Mn:
(10)
Under our construction, M corresponds to the aggregate capacity set for the surgical theatre,
hence M = ¹(T). Analogously, the number of patients of each medical procedure will be





5 EFFECTS ON THE POST-OPERATIVE COSTS
We have to take into account that a surgical intervention generates more costs than the direct
ones derived from the operation. In almost every case, the patient has to spend some time
in the hospital recovering, what is called “Post-Operative Time”.8 This time di¤ers across
8There are exceptions, like the interventions for miopic reduction, in which the patient leaves the hospital just
after being operated.
13medical procedures, and has a random component, because not everybody reacts equally to an
intervention.
The possibilities of ful…ll a certain maximum average waiting time guarantee depend not only
on the capacity of the operating theatre, but also by the availability of beds to treat the patients
during their post-operative time. Actually, there is a second set of servers in the system: the
beds to be used on post-operative patients. We may think of the operating theatre as the source
of patients for this second set of servers. Once a patient exits the theatre, he should enter a
bed. Thus, the system will work properly only if there are enough available beds for the patients
leaving the theatre.
To compute the number of servers (beds) we need for the adequate functioning of the hospital,
we make again use of queueing theory. If patients exit the operation theatre at a rate ¸; they have
al e n g t ho fs t a yi nt h es e r v e ro f1
¹; and there are b servers (beds) in the system, the probability
that a patient has to wait for a server to be free is given by the Erlang’s C formula. Denoting




















where ½ = ¸
b¹ < 1 is the necessary and su¢cient condition for ergodicity in the system.
We can set a maximum value to this probability, and then, by solving previous equation, we
can estimate the number of beds needed, b:
Erlang’s formula can be used to compute the required number of beds under di¤erent sce-
narios: (1) If the procedures share neither the theatre nor the beds; (2) If they share the theatre
and they do not share the beds; (3) If they do not share the theatre but they do share the beds;
and (4) If they share both theatre and beds.
Obviously, and since we cannot analytically solve by Erlang’s formula previous values, it will
be only used for computational purposes. In Section 6 we deal with a numerical example, and
there we illustrate the method to compare all mentioned scenarios.
Nonetheless, what we can do is to introduce in our analysis the impact of sharing the use
of an operating theatre, on the average costs derived from the post-operative period, assuming
that the procedures do not share the use of the beds. That is, we can compute the average
number of beds required in scenarios 1 and 2 of those previously described.
5.1 Average Post-Operative Costs
Considered n …elds of treatment, ordered inversely to their urgency (de…ned by ti), so that the
one with the highest priority (the one with the lowest average waiting time guarantee) is the
14nth medical procedure.
Let di with i =1 ;2;:::n, denote the average number of units of time that a patient of type i
spends recovering at the hospital after the intervention. Again, the service time is exponentially
distributed.




depends on the capacity …xed by its operating theatre in the previous stage and on
its patients expected post-operative time. Formally:






di;i =1 ;2;:::;n: (12)
Therefore, the expected number of beds needed in the system in the absence of cooperation in











When the medical procedures share the use of the operating theatre, they need an amount of
beds according to:























In this situation, as all the patients are treated in the same theatre, when we compute the ex-





treated in the considered period of time, and their corresponding average hospital-
ization times.
Finally, we assume that the post-operative costs are linear in the number of beds. This
reduces the analysis of the costs to the computation of the required amount of beds.
Let us call ¤=
Pn
j=1 ¸j: Comparing scenarios 1 and 2, therefore, we obtain the following
result.









Proof. We have to compute the di¤erence
Pn
i=1¹ bi ¡¹ bN:

























































This completes the proof.
Previous result can be read in the following way: It is not always true that sharing the use
of the operating theatre can lead to smaller average costs in the second stage of the treatment
process (post-operative time). Formula
Pn




ti can be read as follows: On the
left hand side we have the aggregate expected time of hospitalization in a certain period of time
of all individuals entering the queue (if they were going to be served). On the right hand side we





There are savings in the costs of the post-operative period if and only if
Pn
i=1 ¸idi < ¤d:
The explanation for this result has to do with the fact that the number of beds is proportional
to the capacity installed in the previous stage. When the medical procedures cooperate they
a g r e et os e tac o m m o nc a p a c i t y ,w h i c hi sc o m p o s e db yav a r i a b l ef a c t o rd e p e n d i n go ne a c ha n d





. We already proved in Section 3 that this cooperation ensures savings in the direct costs
of the interventions. However, the less urgent …eld has the potential capacity to perform more
interventions per unit of time, than if it were working on its own (since it is guaranteeing a lower
average waiting time to its patients). Depending on its rate of patients’ arrivals, it will make use
of all this additional capacity or not, and this will determine the resulting amount of expected
beds needed. Following this reasoning, we can see how the condition found in Proposition 3
to guarantee savings, is more di¢cult to be ful…lled the smaller the ratio T
ti for each and every
medical treatment. This ratio provides us with a measure of how much the capacity of the
pathologies, which are not …rst in the priority order, increases with respect to the reference
non-cooperative situation.
We will now provide two su¢cient conditions that ensure savings in the average post-
operative costs, from sharing the operating theatre, and which have a clearer intuition. The
next one is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3:
Corollary 4 If ¤T>¸ iti; 8i =1 ;2;:::;n; sharing the operating theatre reduces the average
post-operative costs.
16This condition is enough for making savings in the required number of beds, since it ensures
that all …elds of specialization (for the one with the highest priority it is trivial), use in expected
terms a fraction of the total capacity that is smaller than the one it would set when being
alone. Whereas the capacity of medical procedure i when being alone was ¹i(ti)= 1
ti +¸i; when
cooperating its share of the global one is given by ¸i
¤
1
T + ¸i: Therefore, the smaller expected
capacity required implies a reduction in the average amount of beds for post-operative treatment.
When some of the conditions of Corollary 1 do not hold, it means that some medical pro-
cedures would demand more beds. If this is the case, the e¤ect over the total average costs is
ambiguous, since the extra demand of some medical procedures could be compensated with the
smaller requirement of others. This possibility is analyzed in the following Corollary.
Corollary 5 If dn >
Pn¡1
i=1 ¸idi












































































that is, Proposition 3 holds.
Corollary 2 states that, if the medical procedure with the highest priority has a longer ex-
pected hospitalization time than the average hospitalization time of the rest, then by cooperating
in the use of the operating theatre we reduce the expected amount of required beds.
The longer is the recovering time at hospital, the higher is the impact of an increase in the
capacity of a medical procedure on the amount of beds. This makes that when dn is su¢ciently
high, the decrease in the expected number of beds needed for medical procedure n surely exceeds
the possible increase in the requirements of the others.
6A N U M E R I C A L E X A M P L E
In this Section, we provide a numerical example to illustrate, for a particular case, the main
features of our analysis. The basis of our example is real data obtained from a small hospital,
concerning the average number of patients’ arrivals and their average post-operative time.
In order to set the maximum average time guarantee for the di¤erent procedures, we have
taken into account the actual time spent by the patients in the waiting lists of these pathologies.
17We will consider that the priority of a procedure corresponds to the time guarantee, in such a
way that given two treatments, the one with a shorter waiting time has priority over the other.
We analyze 6 medical procedures (n =6 ) , all of them of elective nature and with a very short
hospitalization time (even null for some cases). The procedures employed are: cataract surgery,
inguinal hernia operations, varicose veins, arthroscopies, hysterectomies and knee replacements.
In the following table we provide the information required for the construction of the example;
all the variables are measured in monthly terms:
Medical Procedures ¸i ti di
Knee Replacements (r) 12 4 0:266
Cataract Surgery (c) 129 2 0:043
Hysterectomies (hy) 19 1 0:243
Arthroscopies (a) 39 1
2 0:083
Inguinal Hernias (h) 33 1
3 0:074
Varicose Veins (v) 15 1
3 0:083
6.1 Operative costs
We …rst compute, using Equation (3), the optimal capacity that each surgical procedure should
install on its own:




2 20 41 36 18
Hence the overall capacity set, in the absence of cooperation is:
X
i2fr;c;hy;a;h;vg
¹i =2 5 6 :75:
When all the procedures share the use of the operating theatre, the capacity (¹(T))i ss e t
a c c o r d i n gt oE q u a t i o n( 7 ) ,w h e r eT is given by tv = th = 1
3:
¹(T) = 247:33:
Hence, if the procedures cooperate, we can reduce the installed capacity of the operating theatre
in an amount of time per month similar to that necessary to perform around 10 interventions. As
we have assumed the costs to be linear in the capacity installed, this will generate a proportional
cost reduction.
18The next step is to assign to the procedures and the patients their corresponding costs. Each
surgical procedure will be charged with its variable cost (determined by its rate of patients’
arrivals ¸i), plus a fraction of the …xed cost. In our case this …xed cost is k
tv =3 k. The sharing
is done following Equations (9) and (10), and it is given by:
Medical Procedures Shi(cf) Shi(c) ¾¤
j(c)
Knee Replacements (r) 1
24k 12:041k 1:0020k






Inguinal Hernias (h) 21
20k 34:05k 1:0305k
Varicose Veins (v) 21
20k 16:05k 1:0685k
The table shows how the part of the …xed costs assigned to each procedure Shi(cf) is in-
creasing in the level of priority of the pathology. However, the sharing of the total costs Shi(c)
does not respect this ranking since it is a¤ected also by the variable costs, i.e., the di¤erent rates
of patients arrivals. In fact, we can see how the …xed costs are only a small fraction of the total
costs of the service. Finally, in the last column we show which would be the part of the total
costs corresponding to each patient, depending on the pathology he belongs to.
6.2 Post-operative Costs
We move now to the analysis of the postoperative period. As we mentioned in Section 5, we
consider the beds as the servers of the system in this part of the process, and we can compute
the required number of beds under di¤erent scenarios: (S_1) if the procedures share neither the
theatre nor the beds; (S_2) if they share the theatre and they do not share the beds; (S_3) if
they do not share the theatre but they do share the beds; and (S_4) if they share both theatre
and beds.
First of all, it is immediate to check that condition in Proposition 3 is ful…lled, even though
neither conditions of Corollary 1 nor Corollary 2 are.9 Consequently, there are savings in the
average number of beds when moving from scenario (S_1) to scenario (S_2).
W e… r s tc o m p u t e ,b ym e a n so fE q u a t i o n( 1 2 )t h ea v e r a g en u m b e ro fb e d sr e q u i r e di ns c e n a r i o
(S_1). Also, we compute using (13) the average aggregate number of beds required in scenario
(S_2), and with the help of the relative frequencies of arrivals, we assign the corresponding
fraction of the total beds to each pathology.
9Conditions of Corollary 1 do not hold, since cataract surgery does not ful…ll the requirement there. Conditions
of Corollary 2 are ful…lled only for one of the two procedures with higher priority: the average hospitalization
time of the inguinal hernias is smaller than the average post-operative period of the other pathologies.
19However, as we stated in Section 5 this does not guarantee that every patient has a bed
when he departs from the operating theatre. Using the Erlang’s C formula, we can …x an upper
bound for the probability of not having a bed ready when it is needed. Once this probability is
…xed, we can solve for the minimum number of beds required to ful…ll it. We will denote this
value by bi.
To avoid an excessive expenditure of resources, and have a situation in which a large number
of beds are “almost always” unused, we set the probability that a patient waits to :1: Notice
that by …xing this upper bound we are in fact setting the expected waiting time of a patient to
a very low level.
The following table shows the average number of beds (¹ bi) and the number of beds required
to guarantee that with probability .9 no patient has to wait (bi), in scenarios (S_1) and (S_2).









Knee Replacements (r) 3:26 3:19 6:35 6:26
Cataract Surgery (c) 5:57 5:55 9:46 9:43
Hysterectomies (hy) 4:86 4:62 8:53 8:21
Arthroscopies (a) 3:42 3:25 6:57 6:40
Inguinal Hernias (h) 2:67 2:45 5:52 5:20
Varicose Veins (v) 1:5 1:25 3:75 3:35
Hence, when the procedures share neither the theatre nor the beds (S_1), the total average





i =2 1 :28;





i =4 0 :18:
One can see how the presence of randomness in the post-operative treatment makes that in
order to ensure a negligible probability of waiting, the number of beds has to be almost doubled
from the reference level (computed in expected terms).
We now see how the results di¤er when the pathologies share the use of the operating theatre





i =2 0 :31;





i =3 8 :85:
In this framework we face the same problem as in scenario 1. When we want to ensure a low
probability of waiting, the required capacity almost doubles, and this means having a lot spare
beds which are needed to cover the risks.
Moreover, we see how by sharing the operating theatre we can decrease both the average
and the total post-operative costs, since it allows to save one bed per-month. Notice that, even
if this seems to be a small improvement, we are dealing with pathologies that have a very short
hospitalization time, and that therefore require few beds. Hence, the decrease in the number of
beds is around 5%.
The next step is to repeat the analysis for the third and fourth scenarios, that is, when the
medical procedures share the use of the beds, distinguishing among a situation where each one
has its own operating theatre (S_3), and another in which there is full cooperation, both in the
operation, and in the hospitalization period (S_4).
In these scenarios, since beds are shared, we consider the rate of patient’s arrivals as the sum
of the average of arrivals of patients coming from the di¤erent procedures, and the hospitalization
time the average of the length of stay at hospital of the pathologies, weighted by the proportion






















21:33 28:32 20:30 27:25
The results are really illustrative, and several insights can be highlighted. First, again,
sharing the use of the operating theatre is always pro…table in terms of the average post-operative
costs. When moving from scenario (S_3) to (S_4), we also save one bed per month.
However the most interesting comparison is between scenarios (S_2) and (S_4) (or analo-
gously between (S_1) and (S_3)). By doing so, we see how crucial it is to share the beds. First
of all, it allows to decrease the extra capacity required to ensure a low probability of waiting
by a 50%. Using as reference for instance scenarios (S_2) and (S_4), we see that the same
probability of waiting can be ensured by setting only 7 extra beds in scenario (S_4), instead of
18 in scenario (S_2). The same occurs confronting situations (S_1) and (S_3).
Moreover, it yields a very important saving in the number of beds that have to be installed
in order to ensure the given probability of waiting. Taking as reference the scenarios in which
the pathologies share the use of the operating theatre, we see how if the medical procedures
21cooperate in the management of the post-operative period, the need for beds is reduced by
nearly a 30% (approximately 11 beds).
The reason for this reduction can be explained by the same argument we used in Subsection
3.3 for the operating theatre costs. We are treating the beds as servers, and by allowing the
di¤erent medical procedures share the use of the beds, we optimally spread risks among them.
Therefore, we set a unique extra capacity of beds to account for the potential bad realizations
of the random variables, instead of making each pathology have its own extra capacity. And
this is shown to generate savings.
However, if we proceed to distribute the costs resulting of the cooperation (S_4), among
the di¤erent medical procedures, the cost sharing game we would face is not an “airport game”.
Although we can identify which pathologies require a bigger capacity than others, since we are
guaranteeing an almost zero probability of waiting for all the patients, the number of beds …xed
by the most demanding procedure is not enough to ensure that nobody has to wait.
But we can compute the Shapley value of this cost-sharing game, just charging each procedure
by averaging its marginal contributions to all coalitions containing it. The cost share of procedure
i is computed as an average of the marginal cost (marginal number of beds) in‡icted by procedure









We next present the results:
Shr(b) Shc(b) Shhy(b) Sha(b) Shh(b) Shv(b)
3:8041 7:3502 6:1996 4:488 3:4834 1:9247
As we can see, the cost share assigned to each procedure is increasing in the number of beds
that they required when they do not share the servers. Moreover, if we compare these costs
shares with the ones is Scenario S_2, we see how the savings range between the 22% reduction
for cataract surgery, and the 43% savings that varicose veins attain. In this example we observe
that the most demanding pathology in terms of required beds (c) is the one that bene…ts less
from cooperation, and conversely varicose veins (which necessity of beds is the minimum) enjoys
the greatest fraction of the savings from cooperation.
7C O N C L U S I O N S
Surgical waiting lists are a persistent and unsatisfactory phenomenon in the Public Health
Services worldwide, since their inception. They have been the subject of a great deal of research.
22In this paper we model the problem of the waiting lists to get surgical treatment making use
of queueing theory. We considered that both, the arrival of patients to the waiting list and the
process of treatment have random components. Therefore, the application of queueing theory
results arises naturally.
The simplifying assumptions of considering an exponential distribution of the time between
two subsequent arrivals and exponential service time distributions, were made for analytical
convenience. The other extreme would be to assume arrivals and service times that are always
constant. The realistic distribution is often somewhere in between (Worthington (1987)).
We concentrate ourselves on the costs that interventions generate, taking into account that
the higher the resources spent by the hospital the shorter the resulting waiting lists. Our aim
in this work has been two-fold.
On the one hand, we study the e¤ects on the direct costs of an intervention that the use of
a common operating theatre by the di¤erent medical procedures has. We show that sharing the
use of the operating theatre leads to a cost reduction.
Afterwards, we study how these savings should be allocated to the medical procedures
through a optimal tari¤. Clearly, we are dealing with a cost allocation problem. Since the
Shapley value is a well-known solution concept with good theoretical and computational prop-
erties, we propose it as the basis for the computation of the optimal fee per medical procedure.
On the other hand, we extend our analysis to the post-operative time. In order to ful…ll the
maximum average waiting time guarantee set by the government, it is necessary not only that
the operating theatre works properly, but also that there is an enough supply of beds for the
recovering of patients at hospital. Therefore, it is relevant to analyze the impact of cooperation
among medical procedures on the post-operative costs.
We obtain that the sign of the e¤ect that sharing the use of the operating theatre has on the
average post-operative costs, depends on the characteristics of the treatments and can not be
stated in general. We compute two su¢cient conditions for making savings also in this second
stage of the process.
Finally, we provide a numerical example to illustrate the main features of our model, on the
basis of real data obtained from a small hospital concerning the average number of patients’
arrivals and the average length of their post-operative time. We apply our theoretical analysis
to this particular case and interpret the results that arise. In particular, we show that when
procedures also cooperate in the managing of beds major savings are obtained.
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